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This article began to develop in my mind during the fall of 1981
when I read the Supreme Court's opinion in Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana,1 as I was preparing notes for my first year
constitutional law class. I was trying to determine how best to pre-
sent to novices the sometimes dry and often confusing materials on
the Commerce Clause, and Commonwealth Edison, at first blush,
seemed to be a good case to use with National League of Cities v.
Usery2 to discuss the scope of permissible federal action under the
Commerce Clause and the concomitant limitations on state action
also imposed by that clause.
In National League of Cities the Court, for the first time in
forty years,3 overruled an act of Congress because it went beyond
the powers granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause. This
suggested a modest judicial revival of federalism as a governing
structural theory, and the case did draw a ragged line attempting
to define the outer limits of national regulatory power.4 The im-
pact of National League of Cities was softened by the Court's de-
cision a few years later in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Association,5 which limited its applicability.6 Even
* Professor of Law, Emory University, Visiting Professor of Law, University of Virginia
1982-83; B.A., 1968, J.D., 1971, Yale University. I thank the Emory University School of
Law for a grant which supported the research for this article and Granvette Mathews of the
Emory Law School Class of 1983 whose work as my research assistant was both speedy and
gracious.
1 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
2 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
3 The last such decision was in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (provi-
sions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 imposing an excise tax and control-
ling wages, hours, and working conditions were beyond the powers of Congress).
4 Professor Tribe found the National League of Cities decision to be a natural develop-
ment from a series of cases decided during the preceding several years that had consistently
expressed solicitude for local and state autonomy. L. TRmE, AmEaicAN CONsTrruTioNAL LAw
§ 5-22, at 309 (1978).
5 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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so, the Court had attempted to draw some line and to reaffirm the
notion of a union of sovereigns in which the national government is
primus inter pares, but in which the national powers cannot be
employed in disregard of individual state sovereignty.
The Commonwealth Edison case presented the Court with the
opportunity to review the limitations of the Commerce Clause in a
somewhat trickier context. The case involved a Montana severance
tax on coal mined in that state. The tax was alleged to have im-
posed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce because vir-
tually all the coal mined in Montana was shipped to other states.
Congress had not acted directly in the area, and so the Court was
faced with an archetypical dormant Commerce Clause issue. Did
Montana's tax so interfere with the free flow of commerce that it
intruded into an area of exclusive federal concern by impeding the
ability of Congress to respond to matters within its plenary pow-
ers? This issue has plagued the Court in one form or another for
more than a century and a quarter,7 and the Court has never de-
veloped a clearly articulated policy for the resolution of the prob-
lem." The Montana tax was upheld, and the Commonwealth
Edison opinion seemed to suggest that the Court might finally be
reaching a consensus about the limits of state taxation powers.
As I was preparing my class notes, I decided that National
League of Cities and Commonwealth Edison, despite serious
problems with the opinions in both cases, would serve reasonably
well as guides to an understanding of the relationship between
Commerce Clause concerns and federalism concerns. This article
was intended to be a short commentary on what looked like a mi-
I In National League of Cities the Court invalidated the 1974 minimum wage and max-
imum hour amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (s)(5), (x)
(Supp. IV 1974), as applied to state and municipal employees. 426 U.S. at 852. The Court
said that by regulating states as employers the law regulated states as states in violation of
the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 845. Hodel involved a challenge to the Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. 1I 1979), which was said
to interfere with the ability of states to engage in zoning and land use planning, thus inter-
fering with states' rights to control the basic property laws of their respective jurisdictions.
452 U.S. at 275-76.
7 See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
s There have been scholarly attempts to fill the void. See, e.g., Tushnet, Rethinking the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. Rav. 125.
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nor trend toward a somewhat less expansive reading of the Com-
merce Clause with a few lurches in one direction or the other. But
then the Court intervened, as it sometimes does, and decided two
cases at the end of the 1982 term' that threw this neat little com-
ment into disarray. Instead of a series of cases leading awkwardly
toward some more comprehensible theory of dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence and perhaps toward greater recognition of
state roles in the federal system, the members of the Court re-
vealed themselves to be as uncertain as ever about the proper role
of federalism values in Commerce Clause cases.
Although National League of Cities forms a necessary backdrop
to an understanding of what the Court seems to be doing in recent
Commerce Clause cases, the focus of this article is on questions
raised by state actions taken in the absence of congressional action.
More narrowly, the main subject of discussion revolves around
state taxation. There are a host of dormant Commerce Clause and
federalism questions raised by various state regulatory statutes,
but tax laws sharpen the perspective because they most particu-
larly involve the exercise of sovereignty by a state. Generally, in
taxation cases the Court is not faced with the fundamental ques-
tion of whether a state has a power to act at all. In fact, in an
opinion rendered during the 1982 term the Court expressly held
that the power to tax is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Thus,
state taxation cases provide an excellent opportunity to examine
the relative weights that are given to the values of state sover-
eignty and national consistency, and can, if one is able to muddle
through them, provide some clues to the Court's position on basic
federalism questions.
In cases involving state regulation of interstate activities through
means other than taxation, the Court has been less solicitous of
state sovereignty as a fundamental value."' Whether this is because
9 Asarco Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 102 S. Ct. 3103 (1982); F.W. Woolworth Co.
v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982).
10 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). For a discussion of Jicarilla
see infra notes 85-107 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Lewis v.
B.T. Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27 (1980); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S.
1983]
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taxation more clearly involves an exercise of inherent sovereignty
429 (1978); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). By
contrast, Professor Eule in a recent, thoughtful article on the dormant Commerce Clause
found it to be useful to avoid, for the most part, state taxation cases. Eule, Laying the
Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 479 (1982).
The trucking cases are illustrative of the lengths to which the Supreme Court has gone
in reviewing state regulitory schemes. Twenty-three years ago the Court invalidated an Illi-
nois statute which required the use of contoured mudguards, as opposed to straight ones, on
large trucks. Illinois said that the regulation was justified by safety considerations. The
Court, after reviewing the facts, determined that the increase in safety was minimal in con-
trast to the additional costs imposed on interstate transportation. Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959). In Bibb the Court not only undertook an extensive factual review
of the controversy, it also judged Illinois by the actions of other states. Illinois was the only
state to have required contoured mudguards; therefore, the Court concluded that Illinois
had to bear a substantially greater burden of proof. 359 U.S. at 528-30. This, of course, left
open the possibility that the standard would become that of the lowest common
denominator.
In the Raymond Motor Transportation case, the Court struck down a Wisconsin stat-
ute barring trucks longer than fifty-five feet from its highways. This, in effect, prohibited
the use of double-rig trailers which are popular in the West and Midwest. The Wisconsin
scheme was replete with exceptions and in several instances clearly favored intrastate opera-
tors. Although the Court engaged in another review of safety factors, the facially discrimina-
tory features of the statute were what spelled its doom, a point particularly noted by the
four who joined a concurring opinion. 434 U.S. at 450 (Blackmun, J., concurring, joined by
the Chief Justice and Justices Brennan and Rehnquist).
In Kassel, decided the same year as Commonwealth Edison, the Court struck down an
Iowa law prohibiting double-rig trailers. The Iowa law did not suffer from the defects of
facial discrimination, although there was some concern about latent protectionism. The
Court again engaged in a lengthy factual analysis and noted, as in Bibb, that Iowa was out of
line with other midwestern states. (It was in line, however, with seventeen southern and
eastern states.) In dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted:
Whenever a State enacts more stringent safety measures than its neighbors, in an
area which affects commerce, the safety law will have the incidental effect of de-
flecting interstate commerce to the neighboring States. Indeed, the safety and pro-
tectionist motives cannot be separated: The whole purpose of safety regulation of
vehicles is to protect the State from unsafe vehicles. If a neighboring State
chooses not to protect its citizens from the danger discerned by the enacting
State, that is its business, but the enacting State should not be penalized when
the vehicles it considers unsafe travel through the neighboring state.
450 U.S. at 705-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Although the result in Kassel might well have been predicted from the analysis em-
ployed in Bibb, the uncertainty that surrounds trucking regulation cases by reason of the
Court's extensive factual reviews has prompted Professor Gunther to ask, "In light of Bibb,
Raymond, and, now, Kassel, what is the modem standard of review of state highway regula-
tions challenged under the commerce clause?" G. GuNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CON-
sTrrmunoNL LAW 19 (Supp. 1981). What is clear is that the rhetoric about deference to state
legislative decisionmaking often seems to be just that, while the Court engages in its own
attempts to insure the existence of a free trade market among the states. In reality, deci-
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or because the Court is not certain of its own underlying theories is
difficult to determine. The Court's own tendency to separate these
broad categories makes for a natural division in an article such as
this. The question whether such a separation is justified would be
a good topic for another study.
This article briefly reviews the history of Commerce Clause chal-
lenges to state tax laws in Section II, and then in Sections III and
IV examines Commonwealth Edison and Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe12 in some detail. Both are severance tax cases in
which the tax was upheld because the Court recognized the need to
protect state sovereignty in Commonwealth Edison and tribal sov-
ereignty in Jicarilla Apache Tribe. Section V examines the com-
peting interests at play in such cases and concludes that on bal-
ance, the arguments in favor of the local tax are stronger and more
consistent with the structure of federalism. Section VI looks at two
1982 state income tax cases1" that substitute a due process analysis
for one based on the Commerce Clause. The Court's choice of anal-
ysis raises questions regarding congressional power to act in the
future that would not have been raised if the income tax cases had
been subjected to Commerce Clause analysis.
Finally, Section VII concludes that the structural organization of
the federal system is an important value that the Court has inade-
quately expressed.' 4 The structure of governmental organization
contemplates a compromise between a supreme national govern-
ment of strictly limited powers and states with considerable sover-
eignty. Federalism is still a key to the American system in that it
provides a framework of competition, a mechanism for experimen-
tation, and a means for the recognition of social and cultural group
sions such as Kassel, Raymond, and Bibb have the effect of protecting the interstate truck-
ing industry while doing little to further a clearer understanding of the proper balance
among governments. Cf. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The
Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1587 n.194 (1977).
12 102 S. Ct. 894 (1982).
13 Asarco Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 102 S. Ct. 3103 (1982); F.W. Woolworth Co.
v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982).
14 The identification of structure as important is far from novel. For instance, I find
myself in agreement with much of what Professor Nagel wrote in a recent article about
National League of Cities. See, Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National
League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. CT. RLv. 81.
1983]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
differences. In recent years, there have been cases in which the
Court has been groping toward an understanding of the dormant
Commerce Clause that would give substantial support to the val-
ues of federalism by allowing maximum state action subject to con-
trol by the political branches of the national government. The two
1982 tax apportionment cases, however, exemplify the continuing
vitality of the individual rights paradigm in constitutional adjudi-
cation. The Court's readiness to pursue an individual rights argu-
ment in cases that could lend themselves to structural analysis
suggests that the idea of structure as a value is far from an ac-
cepted commonplace.
II. STATE TAXATION AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE-A BRIEF
BACKGROUND
Despite the absence of explicit structural separations in the Con-
stitution between state and federal taxing powers, the national and
state governments have worked out an informal but rather well-
ordered separation in their methods of taxation.15 The federal gov-
ernment relies heavily on forms of income taxation.16 States and
their political subdivisions tend to rely heavily on ad valorem
taxes, sales taxes, and use taxes. Of course there are many overlap-
ping areas of taxation, and a change in national law may some-
times have profound ramifications for state tax policy, 17 but there
has developed a remarkable degree of mutual respect for each sov-
ereign's principal sources of revenue.
Nonetheless, a tax imposed by a state or local government on an
item or service that crosses state lines raises a prima facie issue of
state interference in a province of exclusive federal concern. Most
Commerce Clause challenges to state taxes have relied upon the
dormant Commerce Clause. When Congress has the power to act
25 See generally Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 271
(1977).
16 Excise taxes, estate taxes, gift taxes, and miscellaneous other imposts and duties,
although not insubstantial, total only a fraction of the sums raised through personal and
corporate taxes on income.
17 Some states follow the federal pattern of deductions, credits, and the like to simplify
their forms and their auditing procedures. Everytime there is a federal change, however, the
state has to change or face problems in its taxing mechanism.
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but has not acted, does the state tax trespass upon an exclusively
federal matter, or is it an exercise of concurrent sovereignty? If the
latter, does the exercise of concurrent sovereignty effectively pre-
clude or unduly interfere with the potential exercise of congres-
sional power? The difficulties of analysis relevant to these ques-
tions are evident in a review of the many cases in which judges
have attempted to formulate responses. Justice Frankfurter stated
the judicial frustrations well in a 1946 opinion:
The history of this problem is spread over hundreds of
volumes of our Reports. To attempt to harmonize all that has
been said in the past would neither clarify what has gone
before nor guide the future. Suffice it to say that especially in
this field opinions must be read in the setting of the particu-
lar cases and as the product of preoccupation with their spe-
cial facts.'8
In an apparent attempt to slice through complexity and to substi-
tute a simple, straightforward test, courts adopted and long fol-
lowed what came to be known as the "Formal Rule." 19 The thrust
of the Formal Rule was that a state may not impose a tax on any
activity or process viewed by the Court as a part of interstate com-
merce. Courts still had to determine what constituted interstate
commerce, but as the Commerce Clause was read to justify more
and more exercises of congressional regulatory power,20 the activi-
ties that could be said to be a part of interstate commerce tended
to grow in number. The Court applied the Formal Rule to state
taxation statutes whether or not there were any discriminatory ef-
fects of the tax at issue.2 1 The application of the Formal Rule had
1S Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946). See also Dam, supra note 15, at 285.
19 Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Freeman v. Hewit, 329
U.S. 249 (1946). The Spector test was labeled the "Formal Rule" by Professor William B.
Lockhart. Lockhart, A Revolution in State Taxation of Commerce? 65 MMN. L. REv. 1025,
1026 (1981) [hereinafter cited as A Revolution]. See also Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Inter-
state Commerce, 52 HARv. L. REv. 617 (1939) [hereinafter cited as The Sales Tax].
20 See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
21 See, e.g., Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 101 (1974) (there was no
claim that the tax was discriminatory); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S.
602, 607 (1951) (the tax in question did not discriminate between interstate and intrastate
commerce); Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 254, 256-57 (1946) (any showing of discrimina-
1983]
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certain advantages of simplicity and predictability, but it also cre-
ated anomalies that could not withstand serious policy debate.
Multistate companies were able to avoid tax liabilities in many
states in which they did business even if their activities within a
state were functionally no different from those of an intrastate
business that was subject to the tax. On the other hand, a state tax
statute that focused on a "local" object, such as tangible property,
or one that was artfully drawn to appear to be functionally "local"
would often be upheld even though the burden on commerce, mea-
sured by the cost of the tax to the enterprise, might have been
even greater than the burden resulting from a tax "on" interstate
22commerce.
The Formal Rule has now been largely cast aside in favor of an
approach that is apparently intended to focus more on function
and less on form.23 This is best exemplified by Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady,4 in which the Supreme Court unanimously
sustained the validity of a Mississippi tax on the privilege of doing
business in the state. In so doing, the Court expressly overruled
Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor,25 in which the Court had used
the Formal Rule to find such a privilege tax to be per se unconsti-
tion against interstate commerce was unnecessary to the decision). In comparison, where the
tax actually discriminates against enterprises engaged in interstate commerce, the Court will
invalidate the tax on the ground that it discriminates in violation of the Commerce Clause.
See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977); Evco v. Jones, 409
U.S. 91 (1972); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968);
McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S.
435 (1940); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938). The invalidation is consis-
tent both with the goal of avoiding economic Balkanization and with the application of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
22 A Revolution, supra note 19, at 1033. According to Lockhart:
The Court never explained why a tax "on" interstate commerce threatened com-
merce any more than a tax in the same amount, measured the same way, imposed
on a taxable subject. Nor did it attempt to explain why the same pragmatic stan-
dards and other considerations used by the court to protect interstate commerce
from unfair burdens of taxes not subject to the Formal Rule could not also suffice
to protect against unfair burdens from taxes "on" interstate commerce itself.
Id.
22 The more recent formulations suggest a greater scrutiny of underlying facts. Whether
they will in fact apply more to substance than to form remains to be seen. See infra notes
53-84 and accompanying text.
24 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
25 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
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tutional. In Complete Auto the Court said that a state tax should
be subjected to four tests: (1) Does the taxpayer's business activity
have a significant nexus with the state? (2) Does the tax discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce? (3) Is the tax fairly appor-
tioned? (4) Is the tax unrelated to services provided by the state?2"
The Complete Auto decision has met with generally favorable
comment from scholars,27 although there may be doubts about the
ability of judges to undertake some of the complex inquiries that
seem to be compelled by the decision.28 On the whole a test that is
based in functional reality seems to present a more balanced ap-
proach to the problem than one that is based simply on a rule that
amounts to little more than a truism. Unfortunately, it is not alto-
gether clear that the Supreme Court will apply the Complete Auto
test any less mechanically than it applied the Formal Rule.29
The question of state taxation versus free interstate commerce
does present one of the continuing problems of American struc-
tural constitutional law. On the one hand, there is a strong na-
tional interest in the free flow of trade regardless of state bounda-
ries. There may be disagreement about the extent to which the
Framers were interested in the creation of a free national market,"0
but clearly the Framers were concerned about the possibility of
having too many different sovereigns regulating commerce. This is
reflected in the specific constitutional prohibition of state imposts
and duties on foreign trade,31 in the language of the Commerce
Clause, 2 and in limitations on the federal power to raise trade bar-
riers among the states.3 3 At the same time, however, the Constitu-
tion expressly contemplates a national government of limited pow-
26 430 U.S. at 279. Complete Auto was reaffirmed the following year in Department of
Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978), in which the
Court upheld another privilege tax.
27 See, e.g., L. TRBE, supra note 4, § 6-14, at 345; A Revolution, supra note 19, at 1043-
44; Schwartz, Commerce, the States, and the Burger Court, 74 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 409, 431, 438
(1979).
28 See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
30 See Eule, supra note 11, at 429-35.
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
32 Id. at § 8.
33 Id. at § 9.
1983]
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ers in respect of the states as well as in respect of individuals, and
the concept of a free market among the states is one implied from
the negative restraints of the document rather than from an ex-
press statement." The relationship among fifty states, each pos-
sessed of substantial sovereignty, and one central sovereign with
ultimate supremacy in the event of a conflict, is one of continuing
tension at a structural level, which, if properly managed, can help
to sustain the integrity of all the participants. Tax statutes provide
an intriguing field of inquiry because they can raise direct conflicts
between locally made political decisions and national economic
concerns in a context that involves express exercises of sovereignty.
Surely the intent of the Commerce Clause is to prevent each sepa-
rate state from taxing an enterprise so that its cumulative tax bur-
den becomes confiscatory. 5 Surely the Commerce Clause also pre-
vents the wholesale exportation of tax liabilities to the benefit of
in-state residents38 But the Commerce Clause cannot be used as a
cloak to shield enterprises from sharing in the costs of maintaining
a civilized society.87
For the time being, courts must handle such issues under the
rubric of the dormant Commerce Clause. Congress may well have
the power to regulate taxation affecting interstate commerce.38 It
" See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Baldwin v. Seelig, 294
U.S. 511 (1935); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
" This problem has been addressed in part by federal legislation, 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384
(1976), and by the Multistate Tax Compact which was found to be constitutional in U.S.
Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978) (the purposes of the Multistate
Tax Compact were: "(1) facilitating proper determination of state and local tax liability of
multistate taxpayers, including the equitable apportionment of tax bases and settlement of
apportionment disputes; (2) promoting uniformity and compatibility in state tax systems;
(3) facilitating taxpayer convenience and compliance in the filing of tax returns and in other
phases of tax administration; and (4) avoiding duplicative taxation." 434 U.S. at 456.).
" See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (a New York
transfer tax statute taxed securities transactions involving an out-of-state sale more heavily
than most transactions involving a sale within the state).
$7 Cf. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 522 (1937) (an Alabama
tax on employers to provide unemployment benefits for workers was upheld as a means of
distributing the burden of the cost of government).
" Hellerstein, State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: An Historical Perspective,
29 VmD. L. Rav. 335 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Historical Perspective]. See also P. HART-
MAN, STATE TA ATION OF INTEnsTATE Commca 275-85 (1953); Hellerstein, State Income
Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations: Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076,
[Vol. 32
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has acted in a small way to regulate multistate taxation, 9 and it
has considered further action in the area.40 Unless Congress does
more, courts will have to rely on the restraining power of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause to determine the permissible extent of
state taxation. A federal court must decide whether a particular
state tax effectively undermines the national economic unit. The
judicial role is to be protective of the structural integrity" of the
federal system by defining the limits of state sovereignty insofar as
the production of revenue through taxes is concerned.
III. THE Commonwealth Edison Case
Questions of national interests, state sovereignty, and the role of
the courts in reconciling conflicts between them were all involved
in the 1981 case of Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,42 in
which the Court upheld a Montana coal severance tax against ar-
guments that the tax imposed an unfair burden on interstate com-
merce. The factual background is starkly simple. Crude oil and
natural gas prices have greatly increased in the past decade. Mid-
dle eastern supply lines are subject to constant political tension
and overall world supplies are being rapidly consumed. Among al-
ternative energy sources, nuclear power is often even more expen-
sive in the short term, hydroelectric power is available in limited
areas, and solar power is not yet technologically feasible. Coal is
one alternative to other fossil fuels that is readily usable in many
79 MICH. L. Rav. 113 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Reflections].
3, See 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384 (1976).
10 See Reflections, supra note 38. See, e.g., Coal Severance Taxes: Hearings on H.R.
6625, H.R. 6654, and H.R. 7163 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Seass. (1980); Hearings on Pro-
posals Regarding State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Before the Subcomm. on State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93rd Cong., 1st Seass.
(1973).
41 On the importance of structure, see Nagel, supra note 14. The refusal or inability of
Congress to act comprehensively in this area has, however, left an opening into which the
Court has moved. See Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme
Court, 1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. REv. 149 (1976).
Whether the Court should have so readily responded to state taxation questions is another
matter. See generally Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies
and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982).
42 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
1983]
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existing industrial operations, and that is available in enormous
quantities within the continental United States. Bituminous coal
with a low sulphur content is especially prized because its use cre-
ates fewer air pollution problems than other coals. If it can be ex-
tracted by strip mining, so much the better, because the costs in
human life and health, as well as in dollars, are substantially less
than those incurred in deep mining. Montana and other western
states, all of which are sparsely populated, have vast reserves of
low sulphur bituminous coal ready to be extracted by strip mining
techniques for shipment to the population and industrial centers of
the United States to ease the artificial pressures imposed by OPEC
and all the other uncertainties surrounding the oil market.43 A cen-
tral planner might view the coal fields of the West as the answer to
the national demand for cheap and secure energy.
Against this background, the Montana legislature imposed a
substantial severance tax on all coal extracted from Montana
lands.4 This obviously increased the costs of doing business, costs
which eventually were passed on to consumers of Montana coal
before it left Montana at a rate based on volume or on contract
value. The Montana tax was not significantly different from a typi-
cal ad valorem property tax. Severance taxes had even been sus-
3 See generally R. NEHRING, B. ZYCHER, & J. WHARTON, COAL DEVELOPMENT AND Gov-
ERNMENT REGULATION IN THE NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT (1976); Note,
The Increasing Conflict Between State Coal Severance Taxation and Federal Energy Pol-
icy, 57 TEx. L. REV. 675 (1979).
"" MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-103 (1977) provides:
(1) A severance tax is imposed on each ton of coal produced in the state in accor-
dance with the following schedule:
Heating quality
(Btu per pound
of coal): Surface Mining Underground Mining
Under 7,000 12 cents or 20% of value 5 cents or 3% of value
7,000-8,000 22 cents or 30% of value 8 cents or 4% of value
8,000-9,000 34 cents or 30% of value 10 cents or 4% of value
Over 9,000 40 cents or 30% of value 12 cents or 4% of value
"Value" means the contract sales price.
(2) The formula which yields the greater amount of tax in a particular case shall
be used at each point on this schedule.
(3) A person is not liable for any severance tax upon 20,000 tons of the coal he
produces in a calendar year.
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tained during the lifetime of the Formal Rule.45 When the tax was
challenged, the Montana Supreme Court upheld it as a matter of
law without requiring that any evidence be taken, reasoning, in
part, that the severance tax attached to a wholly intrastate activ-
ity-the removal of coal from the ground-and thus did not impli-
cate the Commerce Clause at all.4' Approximately ninety percent
of the coal mined in Montana and subjected to the severance tax
was destined for out-of-state users. The challengers argued that
the tax was, in practical effect, a tax on interstate commerce. The
tax burden, although applied equally to coal bound for intrastate
as well as extrastate use, was almost entirely exported. Purchasers
of electricity in New York were paying the taxes that went into the
Montana treasury.
The Supreme Court applied the four part Complete Auto test,4'7
and in an opinion by Justice Marshall,48 found that the tax did not
unduly burden interstate commerce. The first two parts of the
Complete Auto test were easily satisfied. The nexus of the tax was
wholly within Montana,'9 and because it was a one-time tax it did
not give rise to any problem of multiple, vexatious taxation.50 The
third question-whether the tax was discriminatory-was also
quickly handled. The rate of taxation was based on the amount of
coal actually removed from the ground and did not vary with the
eventual destination of the coal.51 Even though the entire lawsuit
was based on the fact that the coal was bound for other places, the
Court dismissed the point as an "adventitious" consideration.52
The fourth part of the Complete Auto test received somewhat
45 Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord,
262 U.S. 172 (1923); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922). The Court rea-
soned in all these cases that the severance tax was a purely intrastate action.
46 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, - Mont. , 615 P.2d 847, 854 (1980),
aff'd, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
47 453 U.S. at 617-29.
48 The majority was comprised of Justice Marshall, the Chief Justice, and Justices
Brennan, Stewart, White, and Rehnquist. Justice White filed a separate concurrence. Id. at
637. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Powell and Stevens, dissented. Id. at 638.
49 Id. at 617.
50 Id.




greater attention. A tax must be "fairly" related to the services
provided by the state."53 The challengers argued that they should
be allowed to attempt to prove that the amount of the tax col-
lected was not fairly related to any costs incurred by the state as a
result of coal mining. They did not object to the power of Montana
to enact some form of severance tax; they simply argued that the
rate of taxation should be examined in the context of the public
costs associated with the mining activities and that this determina-
tion could not be made on a motion to dismiss without the creation
of a factual record.5 The Court explicitly rejected this argument.
In the Court's language: "This assertion reveals that appellants la-
bor under a misconception about a court's role in cases such as
this. The simple fact is that the appropriate level or rate of taxa-
tion is essentially a matter for legislative, and not judicial, resolu-
tion. ' 55 This does little more than reduce the fourth part of the
Complete Auto test to a truism. Practically every enterprise in-
volves some costs to the state in which it operates. The Court
seems to be saying that so long as a tax based on the intrastate
activities is not confiscatory or discriminatory, it satisfies the
"fairly related" test. It is probably true that courts are ill equipped
to make the kinds of inquiries that would be required by the close
analysis suggested by the applicants in Commonwealth Edison.
There also may be good arguments that the use of a factual test
would involve inappropriate intrusions into the legislative process.
Nevertheless, the only conclusion that can be drawn from the case
is that virtually any tax can be made to satisfy the "fairly related"
test of Complete Auto.
Perhaps the most interesting argument advanced by the appel-
lants was that the Montana tax interfered with national energy
policies as defined by a variety of federal statutes.5 The argument
puts in bold form the classic conflict of federalism. What is a mat-
ter of such national commercial concern that even with due respect
"430 U.S. at 279.
54 453 U.S. at 620-21.
Id. at 627 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 633. Among the laws cited were the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of
1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (1976) and the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of
1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8483 (Supp. 1I 1979).
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for the sovereignty of the various states, state action has to be
stricken? In response to the economic disarray that characterized
trading relationships among the several states during the time of
the Articles of Confederation, 7 Alexander Hamilton wrote that a
national power to regulate commerce was one of the essential req-
uisites of a new federal constitution.58 That being so, and sources
of energy being critical to the success of the American industrial
enterprise, it is not unreasonable to suggest that local taxes that
burden energy production have an effect on the national concern
with interstate commerce that may implicate federal policies. Fur-
thermore, the appellants were not forced to rely solely on the nega-
tive implications of the dormant Commerce Clause. Congress,
before acting, had debated national energy policies at great length.
On the other hand, Montana could-and did-argue with con-
siderable historical justification that any attempt to preempt an
exercise of its taxing power (an essential ingredient of sovereignty)
must be scrutinized carefully. With the exception of "imposts or
duties on imports or exports, 59 states share a "concurrent and co-
equal authority" with each other and with the federal government
to lay taxes for the production of revenue.60 In the interpretation
of powers that are concurrently exercised, the judicial branch tra-
ditionally has been careful to interpret statutes to be consistent
with one another.6" In this instance, the Court tipped the balance
in favor of federalism and against a consistent national energy pol-
icy that would have limited individual state authority.
Proving once again that reasonable, rational, intelligent, edu-
cated men can reach utterly different conclusions from a review of
the same evidence, Justice Blackmun wrote a sharp dissent in
which Justices Powell and Stevens joined.62 The split among the
Justices can be viewed, in part, as a disagreement about procedure.
57 See, e.g., Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, 1783-1789, in THE GOLDEN
AGE OF AMERICAN HISTORY 245 (F. Friedel ed. 1959).
THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (A. Hamilton).
"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
"THE FEDERALIST No. 31 (A. Hamilton).
61 See generally Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450
U.S. 311 (1981); Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978).
62 453 U.S. at 638 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1983]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
The trial court had sustained the validity of the tax without receiv-
ing any evidence." This result subsequently was affirmed by the
Montana and United States Supreme Courts. The dissenters
thought at the very least that the complainants raised issues of
sufficient complexity to require more careful scrutiny.,
This apparent procedural disagreement could not mask the basic
disagreement about the interpretation and application of the
fourth part6 5 of the Complete Auto test, because the question
whether evidence had to be taken went to the heart of the meaning
of the test. In the words of Justice Blackmun:
The Court's conclusion ... rests on the premise that the
relevant inquiry under the fourth prong of the Complete
Auto Transit test is simply whether the measure of the tax is
fixed as a percentage of the value of the coal taken.... This
interpretation emasculates the fourth prong. No trial will ever
be necessary on the issue of fair relationship so long as a
State is careful to impose a proportional rather than a flat tax
rate; thus, the Court's rule is no less "mechanical" than the
approach entertained in Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260
U.S. 245 (1922), disapproved today .... Under the Court's
reasoning, any ad valorem tax will satisfy the fourth prong;
indeed, the Court implicitly ratifies Montana's contention
that it is free to tax this coal at 100% or even 1,000% of
value, should it choose to do so .... Likewise, the Court's
analysis indicates that Montana's severance tax would not
run afoul of the Commerce Clause even if it raised sufficient
revenue to allow Montana to eliminate all other taxes upon
its citizens. 66
The dissenters were concerned about state "tailoring" of taxes to
The figures relied on in the various opinions were included in pleadings and briefs.
They are not data which were subjected to standard requirements of evidence nor to cross-
examination.
" 453 U.S. at 638 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). The dissenters also seemed to be im-
pressed by the increase in the proportion of total state revenues derived from the severance
tax from 0.4% in 1972 to about 20% in 1979 with the result that Montana had been able to
reduce local property and income taxes. Id. at 642.
as The dissenters agreed that the first three parts of the test had been satisfied. Id. at
644-54.
"Id. at 645-46 (footnotes omitted).
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export costs.61 In short, they suggested that when a prima facie
case of tax exportation is set forth, close scrutiny is necessary
under Complete Auto to determine whether, indeed, there is some
real relationship between the costs attributable to the taxed enter-
prise and the taxation imposed upon it. 5 Any such inquiry would
require a reasonably complex analysis of economic conditions, but
Justice Blackmun did not consider such an inquiry to be beyond
the level of competence of judges.6 9 While it may not be necessary
to go so far as to adopt entirely the rather mechanistic application
of the test advanced by the majority, there are significant ques-
tions raised by Justice Blackmun's suggestion that,
if the tax singles out this particular interstate activity and
charges it with a grossly disproportionate share of the general
costs of government, the court must determine whether there
is some reasonable basis for the legislative judgment that the
tax is necessary to compensate the State for the particular
costs imposed by the activity.70
This necessarily would involve courts in what could turn out to be
extraordinarily complex and extensive hearings on matters that in-
volve delicate policy decisions and value judgments. Such inquiries
might also open up the possibility of further challenges to taxes on
due process or equal protection grounds. For instance, the same
argument could be raised by a wholly intrastate enterprise that
considered itself to be facing a tax liability disproportionate to
those borne by other kinds of enterprises. The national constitu-
tional interest involved by reason of the nexus with interstate com-
merce in the Montana case is no greater than the national consti-
tutional interest in prohibiting a state from denying to a citizen
the equal protection of the laws-including fair adjustments of tax
liabilities.
What kinds of inquiries might have to be made to satisfy the
fourth part of the Complete Auto test in accordance with the dis-
senters' opinion? The first, and in this case simplest, question is
67 Id. at 650.
Id. at 649-51.




whether the tax is on what is primarily an intrastate or primarily
an interstate activity. A severance tax attaches to a purely local
undertaking. The application of a strictly geographic kind of test
would result in a finding of intrastate taxation, but such an analy-
sis is so cramped and limited that it ultimately makes little sense.
Indeed, one of the major criticisms of the Formal Rule was just
this sort of mechanistic, unrealistic approach.7 1 The parties in the
Commonwealth Edison case agreed that approximately ninety per-
cent of the coal mined in Montana was destined for out of state
markets. 2 The severance tax was no different from any other cost
of doing business in the sense that it would be included in the
price paid by the ultimate purchasers of the coal, most of whom
were outside Montana. Thus, simply noting that the application of
the tax is to the intrastate activity of physical extraction overlooks
the fact that the tax is eventually paid by people in other states.
On the other hand, the fact that ultimate consumers in other
states pay the tax through higher prices for coal does not indicate
that the tax is an invalid burden on interstate commerce. If that
were so, ad valorem property taxes, income taxes, sales taxes, use
taxes, and virtually all state taxes paid by multistate businesses
could be subjected to Commerce Clause attacks because they all
contribute to the cost base of a product and determine its eventual
price. The market realities of the coal industry suggest that the
extraterritorial effect of a locally applied tax may be so substantial
that it places an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce."3
What is unreasonable is not, unfortunately, self-evident. If the first
inquiry leads to a determination that there is a significant extrater-
ritorial effect, then a court applying the Blackmun test would have
to determine whether the effect was justifiable. In Justice Black-
mun's defense, he was attempting to guide the Court in the direc-
tion suggested by its rejection of the Formal Rule in Complete
Auto. The majority's interpretation of Complete Auto in Common-
71 See generally A Revolution, supra note 19; The Sales Tax, supra note 19.
72 453 U.S. at 617.
73 As Professor Dam has pointed out, a state has wide latitude within the structure of
the federal constitution to tax goods, services, activities, property, and income within its
borders unless there are raised questions of "protectionism, extraterritoriality or multiple
burdens." Dam, supra note 15, at 286.
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wealth Edison, while not without merit, amounts to little more
than the substitution of one formal rule for another. But in contin-
uing this inquiry, the dissenters' approach swiftly runs into diffi-
culties. If we accept the premise, as the Court has done, that a
multistate business may be required to share in the costs of main-
taining local and state governments,"4 then a court must try to de-
termine what costs to the state are attributable to the intrastate
activities of the enterprise in question. One way would be to look
at the size of the activity in terms of gross revenues or number of
employees, but that approach again would amount to the substitu-
tion of a mechanical test that fails to account for real economic
impact. In the case of coal mining, the following kinds of questions
could be raised: (1) Are more firemen, policemen, and similar pub-
lic safety personnel needed? (2) Is there greater demand on water,
sewage, and solid waste disposal systems that will require addi-
tional capital expenditures, either now or sooner than originally
budgeted? (3) Will more workers be attracted to the, mining area,
thereby causing greater demand for housing, schools, hospitals,
* and other services? (4) If there is a "boom," is it likely to be long
or short term? That is, will new roads, sewers, schools, etc., be used
for a period equivalent to their anticipated useful lives or will they
be used for a shorter time and then be left as white elephants? (5)
What will be the environmental costs in the short term during op-
erations and in the long term after the coal has been extracted?75
(6) What will happen to the property tax base after it has been
depleted of minerals? Other questions no doubt could arise, but
these few suggest the flavor of the kinds of issues that would have
to be addressed in making a decision about the costs of a particu-
lar activity. Left out of the list are any questions about social de-
sirability. What if the people of Montana really do not want coal
mining, or only want it if paid enough? If the whole state could be
74 See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940); West-
ern Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
71 The conflict between state and local interests in environmental protection and the
interests of multistate businesses in free trade can be sharp. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control
Comm'n, 15 Ore. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973); Note, supra note 43, at 681; Note, State




zoned to prevent mining or if a law could be passed prohibiting
mining, then why not a tax that allows mining but only at a high
price?76
No court is adequately equipped to engage in the kind of analy-
sis that would be required were the foregoing questions presented
for review. It is virtually impossible for a court, with its limited
resources, to determine with any degree of accuracy the costs to a
town, county, or state of a particular industry. About all that can
be said is that any industrial activity will bring with it some costs
and that it is not unreasonable for that activity (and those who
eventually profit from it, be they shareholders or consumers) to
share in those costs. A tax may be imposed that is so grossly out of
line with any reasonable allocation of costs that it raises a question
of fairness, but so long as there also may be questions of social
policy, a court ultimately would be faced with the necessity of
making a value judgment about the relative utilities of competing
policies. Courts do make such decisions, and the dormant Com-
merce Clause does act as a brake on state policies that intrude into
an area reserved for national action, but, as a general proposition,
the better part of valor is for courts to be hesitant to make conclu-
sive judgments in such cases."
Furthermore, even if some idea of relative costs can be estab-
lished, and even if it can be shown that a particular tax is greater
than the aliquot share of costs attributable to a certain enterprise,
76 On the use of severance taxes to advance conservation policies, see Whiteside & Gil-
lig, Coal and Conservation-Tax Policy, 64 Ky. L.J. 573 (1976).
7 In a slightly different context, the argument was recently put by one commentator as
follows:
Political bodies and courts respond to different institutional imperatives. They
overlap in many ways, and may be equally capable of performing a number of
functions, albeit in their characteristic institutional fashions. Devising remedies
for constitutional violations in institutional suits, however, is not such a function.
Legal standards for devising institutional remedies are absent because the
problems they pose are, and inevitably must be, polycentric and non-legal in na-
ture. As a matter of fundamental structure, even where a constitutional violation
has been found, a court cannot legitimately resolve such a problem unless the
political bodies that ordinarily should do so are in such serious and chronic de-
fault that there is realistically no other choice.
Fletcher, supra note 41, at 696.
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the inquiry is far from complete. There are, to begin with, the gen-
eralized, nonspecific costs of a "civilized society. ' For example,
ad valorem property taxes are regularly used for the support of
public schools, even though they are paid by property owners who
have no children or who use private schools as well as by those who
do have children in public schools. Other activities may be deter-
mined to have social value or to cause social harm and this deter-
mination may be manifested in tax policies. There may be tax
breaks granted to certain industries for certain purposes. Deduc-
tions and credits abound to encourage'or to discourage a myriad of
activities. So long as tax policies are not wholly divorced from so-
cial policies, one cannot complain, as a matter of constitutional
law, unless there is discrimination within a defined class or unless
there is discrimination between intra and interstate commerce.
Thus, the fact that a coal severance tax imposes a burden on the
coal industry that may be disproportionate to the direct costs asso-
ciated with that industry does not by itself end the inquiry. There
would have to be a showing of discriminatory impact on interstate
commerce unjustified by local policies based on costs or social
values.
Justice Blackmun's argument follows logically from the language
of Complete Auto. Nevertheless, his approach would necessitate
judicial inquiry into issues that generally are beyond the technical
competence of courts and that involve courts in the kind of fact
finding and policy determinations that often are better left to the
legislative branches. In the absence of extensive factual inquiries,
the Blackmun analysis easily could fall prey to problems of arbi-
trariness. There is little that is more susceptible to unpredictabil-
ity than courts applying a complicated test to issues of great fac-
tual complexity in situations involving evidentiary presentations of
widely differing quality."'
78 See Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 228 (1980) (taxation of the
income of a corporation doing business in several states must be fairly related to services
provided by the taxing state, "which include police and fire protection, the benefit of a
trained work force, and 'the advantages of a civilized society.'" (quoting Japan Line v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979)).
79 Judicial incompetence in the area of income apportionment has long been recognized.
See Hellerstein, supra note 41, at 188-92. That did not prevent the Court from entering the
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Justice White's short concurrence was the most sensitive to the
serious institutional concerns suggested by Commonwealth
Edison.80 Although this opinion was a brief two paragraphs, it con-
tained the essence of dormant Commerce Clause cases. Congress
can act to establish policies with respect to energy resource devel-
opment. It may even have the power to develop policies that limit
state action in matters such as land planning, which have tradi-
tionally been of local concern, if the national consequences are of
sufficient moment."1 But Congress has not acted and the purpose
of the Court in applying the dormant Commerce Clause is to delin-
eate those areas that are totally closed to state regulation whether
or not Congress ever acts. In the absence of Congressional preemp-
tion, the Court can act only as a restraining power that defines the
limits of state sovereignty within the federal union . 2
Justice White's concurrence puts the Commonwealth Edison de-
cision in perspective as essentially a federalism case. There may be
serious arguments addressed to the majority's rather technical dis-
missal of the appellants' arguments. The Complete Auto test
seems to require at least minimal factual inquiry that would pre-
clude such a summary disposition of the case. There may be good
reasons for avoiding the kind of complex factual analysis that
would seem to be demanded by the dissenters' reading of Com-
plete Auto. On the other hand, the majority in Commonwealth
Edison did seem to contemplate a review akin to that used in state
regulation, as opposed to taxation, cases.8 3 The manner in which
the majority disposed of the appellants' case suggests the substitu-
fray in 1982. See infra notes 120-40 and accompanying text.
80 453 U.S. at 637 (White, J., concurring).
81 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
81 [T]he institutional nature of a judicial tribunal and the constitutional inability
of the Supreme Court under the Commerce Clause to do more than restrain undue
state tax burdens on interstate commerce make the Court inherently incapable of
dealing adequately with the complex problems posed by state and local taxation of
multistate enterprises.
Historical Perspective, supra note 38, at 339 (citing P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTER-
STATE COMMERCE 275-85 (1953)).
83 453 U.S. at 615. As examples of decisions involving state regulation see Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525
(1949); cases cited supra note 11.
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tion of simply another magical incantation for the one disapproved
in Complete Auto. Be that as it may, Commonwealth Edison did
indicate that the Court was somewhat more attuned to federalism
issues, a development that should not have been surprising after
the same Court had decided National League of Cities v. Usery.s
Even the dissenters did not conclude that Montana had over-
stepped its bounds. They simply thought that the appellants
should have a chance to prove their case.
IV. THE Jicarilla Apache CASE
The Court's concern with definitions of sovereignty, which are
essential to the full development of federalist theory, was particu-
larly apparent in the 1982 case of Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe.s5 That case involved a tax imposed by an Indian tribe on
the severance of natural gas and oil from its reservation. Undoubt-
edly Indian tribes are not states, and they were not participants in
the original constitutional process. Nevertheless, they are quasi-in-
dependent sovereignties existing within and under the protection
of the United States. They have treaties with the federal govern-
ment just as sovereign nations do. The Court's conception that the
relationship between the federal government and the Indian tribes
is one of relative respect as among sovereigns is relevant to more
traditional federalism issues.
The Jicarilla Apaches live on a reservation in northwestern New
Mexico that was set aside as tribal trust property by an 1887 Exec-
utive Order."s The Tribe is organized pursuant to the Indian Reor-
ganization Act of 193487 and has a constitution that has been ap-
proved by the Secretary of the Interior.8" Pursuant to the Tribe's
" 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Even so, National League of Cities remains the only recent case
in which the Court struck down an act of Congress as being beyond the national powers
contained in the Commerce Clause, and the Court has invalidated several recent exercises of
state regulatory power on dormant Commerce Clause grounds. See supra note 11 and cases
cited therein. However, the Court has also held that a state could refuse to allow interstate
sales of cement from state owned plants in order to favor domestic purchasers. Reeves, Inc.
v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
85 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
86 Id. at 133.
87 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-492 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
88 455 U.S. at 134.
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constitution, the tribal council "may levy and collect taxes and fees
on tribal members, and may enact ordinances, subject to approval
by the Secretary of the Interior, to impose taxes and fees on non-
members of the tribe doing business on the reservation." 8 For
some time the tribal council has leased the mineral rights to sub-
stantial portions of its land, and in 1976 the tribal council, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, imposed a severance tax
on oil and gas production from tribal land. 0 Thus the Tribe re-
ceived royalties from the mineral leases plus severance taxes. The
lessees were also subject to a New Mexico severance tax.9 1
The Indian severance tax was challenged on two grounds: first,
that the Tribe did not have the power to impose the tax; and sec-
ond, that the tax violated the Commerce Clause. The Supreme
Court upheld the tax against both challenges, with Justice Mar-
shall writing the majority opinion as he had in Commonwealth
Edison. There were, however, several shifts on the Court. Justices
Blackmun and Powell, who had dissented in the earlier case, joined
the majority while the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, who
had been in the Commonwealth Edison majority, joined the dis-
senting opinion of Justice Stevens.
The Court found the power of taxation to be an essential attri-
bute of sovereignty "because it is a necessary instrument of self-
government and territorial management." 92 The status of an In-
dian tribe was analogized to that of a state in that the latter is
entitled to collect royalties as well as severance taxes.9 3 More im-
portantly, the majority rejected the argument relied upon by the
dissenters that the power to tax is a function of the power to ex-
clude.94 Rather, the power to tax, according to the Court, derives
89 JICARLLA APACHE TRmH CONST. art. XI, § 1, quoted in 455 U.S. at 135.
90 455 U.S. at 135-36.
91 25 U.S.C. section 398c (1976) permits state taxation of mineral production on Indian
Reservations.
92 455 U.S. at 137. The Court also relied upon its decision in Washington v. Confeder-
ated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), in which the Court said:
"[t]he power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe
or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless
divested of it by federal law" or necessary implication of their dependent status." Id. at 152.
92 455 U.S. at 138.
94 Id. at 141-44.
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simply from the fact of sovereignty. The Court did not say that the
power to tax is unfettered, but it did establish a clear precedent
that the attribute of sovereignty alone creates a taxing power. Al-
though a state does not have a general power of exclusion because
all citizens are free to travel,9 5 a state may have the power to ex-
clude a certain product 6 or to prohibit certain uses of property.97
But if the Jicarilla Apache case means what it says, then whether
or not a state has the power to exclude a product or an activity
should not determine the extent of a state's power of taxation.
The other line of argument against the Jicarilla Apache tax was
similar to that advanced against the Montana coal severance tax.
It was said to violate the "'negative implications' of the Commerce
Clause because it taxes an activity that is an integral part of the
flow of commerce, discriminates against interstate commerce, and
imposes a multiple burden on interstate commerce."' 8 The major-
ity decided first that the dormant Commerce Clause was inapplica-
ble because Congress in fact had acted specifically on the subject.
Therefore, the problem was to attempt to reconcile the Indian ac-
tion with federal statutes. The Court's inquiry was at an end be-
cause Congress had directly addressed the kind of question posed
in this case and because the severance tax was enacted in accor-
dance with and pursuant to specifically granted authority.9
5 See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (a California statute making it a
misdemeanor for anyone knowingly to bring or assist in bringing into the state a nonresi-
dent indigent person held invalid).
" A state can exclude alcoholic beverages, for instance. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI, §
2.
9 See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (upheld zoning ordinance
limiting development of land); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (up-
held Detroit zoning ordinance regulating the location of adult theatres); Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upheld ordinance regulating dredging and pit excava-
tion on property); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upheld zon-
ing ordinance restricting location of industries).
98 455 U.S. at 152-53.
99 In the words of the Court-
Once Congress acts, courts are not free to review state taxes or other regulations
under the dormant Commerce Clause. When Congress has struck the balance it
deems appropriate, the courts are no longer needed to prevent States from bur-
dening commerce, and it matters not that the courts would invalidate the state




Although they were unnecessary to the decision and therefore
are nothing more than dictum, statements by the majority indicate
that the tax also would be valid under the Complete Auto test.
The major challenge to the tax was based upon the third part of
the test-that the tax discriminated against interstate commerce
because oil and gas used by lessees or received by the Tribe as in-
kind royalty payments was not subject to the tax. The Court re-
jected the argument because all that would be necessary to avoid
the problem would be some "administrative makework." 100
In the section discussing the possible application of the Com-
plete Auto test to the Jicarilla Apaches, the majority opinion in-
cluded a footnote that could have significant implications for fu-
ture state tax cases. 101 In the Supreme Court the petitioners made
no attempt to challenge the tax on the basis of the fourth prong of
the Complete Auto test, the provision that was at the heart of the
dispute in the Commonwealth Edison case. At the trial the Tribe
had attempted to present evidence showing that it provided ser-
vices sufficient to meet the "fairly related" test, but the petitioners
objected that such evidence was irrelevant, and the trial court sus-
tained the objection.10 2 On appeal, the court of appeals ruled that
the failure of the petitioners to build (or permit the building of) a
factual foundation on this issue meant that "there was no basis on
which to find that the tax was not fairly related to the services
provided by the Tribe. ' 10 3 The petitioners thus were left in a bit of
a quandary, although one partly of their own making. A fair read-
ing of the Commonwealth Edison majority opinion was that the
"fairly related" test was one of law that could be determined with-
out a factual record, although this conclusion was disputed by the
three dissenters who quite reasonably felt that the nature of the
test was essentially factual. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
petitioners chose to limit their attack at the trial to matters of law,
although the services provided by the Indian Tribe were probably
Id. at 154.
100 Id. at 158.
101 Id. at 157 n.23.
102 The district court held that the tax was illegal. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
No. 77-292 (D.N.M. Dec. 29, 1977).
103 455 U.S. at 157 n.23 (citing 617 F.2d 537, 545 n.4 (10th Cir. 1980)).
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so minimal that it might well have been prudent to establish at
least some kind of record. As it turned out, however, the petition-
ers had chosen the wrong tactics because the appeals court ruled
that the "fairly related" test would be presumed to have been met
by the taxing authority absent any factual evidence to the con-
trary. The Supreme Court did not disturb this portion of the lower
court's opinion. The long and short of all this seems to be that
Commonwealth Edison treats the Complete Auto four-part test as
a legal standard that can be analyzed without the development of a
factual record, but the Jicarilla Apache opinion suggests, albeit in-
directly by way of a footnote to a portion of the opinion that is
dictum, that in the absence of a factual record the tax under chal-
lenge will be presumed valid. This presumption can leave a chal-
lenger in an almost impossible situation, and since such a result
does not really make sense in terms of basic fairness, one only can
assume that future litigants will seek to have some judicial clarifi-
cation. The result in Jicarilla Apache does tend to reinforce the
notion, however, that the Commonwealth Edison interpretation of
Complete Auto transforms that apparently factual test into one
which is largely mechanical.""
For purposes of this discussion the most intriguing aspects of the
Jicarilla Apache case were: (1) the clear, unequivocal recognition
by the Court that the exercise of a power of taxation is definitional
to a concept of sovereignty and that it exists in a sovereign by rea-
son of the fact of sovereignty and not by reason of the existence of
some other power, such as the power to exclude; 10 5 (2) an implicit
104 The dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusions about the powers available to
the Jicarilla Apaches as quasi-sovereigns pursuant to the various statutes and treaties gov-
erning their legal existence. 455 U.S. at 184 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Their concern was not
with the application of Complete Auto, because the essential problem was not one involving
the negative restraints of the dormant Commerce Clause.
The majority responded to the petitioners' multiple taxation complaint by saying that
it was appropriate only as a dormant Commerce Clause complaint and should be directed at
the New Mexico severance tax rather than at that of the Indian Tribe. Id. at 158 n.26.
105 Although the minority opinion did not speak directly to this point, it was not incon-
sistent with this notion of a sovereign's powers. Rather, the dissenters seemed to have a
different theory of sovereignty for Indian tribes. They concluded that the Jicarilla Apaches
possessed substantial powers of internal self-governance, but only such powers over non-
tribal members as were clearly and specifically granted by federal laws or treaties. This
approach was justified by reference to the idea of self-governance itself. Nonmembers have
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recognition of a value in having multiple sovereignties within the
federal system;10 6 and (3) deference to the determination of appro-
priate political actions by a subordinate sovereign at the expense,
perhaps, of a national interest in minimizing costs associated with
multi-sovereign commercial transactions. 10 7
V. STRUCTURE AND VALUES
An examination of the values implied by or inherent in the sev-
erance tax cases makes possible the development of a matrix for
the consideration of the tensions built into the federal system. It
also provides the chance to reconsider the relative importance of
constitutional structure as a means for the protection of demo-
cratic process. Professor Nagel, for instance, has suggested that the
Supreme Court's focus on federalism and the structural integrity
of the American system in National League of Cities was a healthy
development whether or not that particular decision was correct.108
The federal government itself is made up of coequal branches in
which competition, checks, and balances provide a structural
means for the preservation of the system's health. Federalism car-
ries this structural form to a larger arena and provides a wider va-
riety of opportunities for participation in the political process.
little or no voice over tribal decisions; therefore, the absence of an effective political check
means that the Tribe has little right to act in ways contrary to the interest of nonmembers.
Id. at 171-73. That agreement has credence in a discussion of political rights, but the Indian
situation is somewhat different. The Jicarilla Apaches may not have a full power of exclu-
sion, but they do own reservation property. The proper analogy-if one exists-is state
power over state-owned property, not state regulatory power in general. See, e.g., Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
106 455 U.S. at 148.
107 In the Court's language:
We find no "clear indications" that Congress has implicitly deprived the Tribe of
its power to impose the severance tax. In any event, if there were ambiguity on
this point, the doubt would benefit the Tribe, for "[a]mbiguities in federal law
have been construed generously in order to comport with ... traditional notions
of sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence."
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracher, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980). Accord-
ingly, we find that the Federal Government has not divested the Tribe of its in-
herent authority to tax mining activities on its land, whether this authority de-
rives from the Tribe's power of self-government or from its power to exclude.
455 U.S. at 152.
"8 See Nagel, supra note 14, at 97-98.
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To use the severance tax cases as examples, a tabulation of val-
ues supporting or opposing the tax might include:
In opposition to such a tax:
(1) There is a national interest in the development and main-
tenance of supplies of fuels that are critical to industrial de-
velopment, home heating, electricity and similar uses, espe-
cially in light of the tensions affecting the availability of
middle eastern oil supplies.
(2) Taxes on energy supplies add costs that may be severely
inflationary because of the national dependence on fossil
fuels.
(3) Increased costs of domestic supplies may lead to greater
dependence on foreign sources that may affect national secur-
ity and the direction of foreign policy.
(4) Industrial and population centers do not have adequate
supplies of fuels and should not be made to support, through
tax revenues, people who happen to live near concentrations
of such fuels by reason of an accident of geography.
(5) Such a tax can result in an unreasonable redistribution of
wealth.
(6) Those who pay the tax as consumers do not have an effec-
tive voice in the political decisions leading up to the tax. This
amounts to taxation without representation.
(7) Such a tax can lead to economic Balkanization in an in-
dustry that is critical to the maintenance of an integrated na-
tional economy.
In support of such a tax the following points might be made:
(1) Taxation, as stated in the Jicarilla Apache case, is a fun-
damental aspect of sovereignty, and the maintenance of state
sovereignty is essential to the life and health of the demo-
cratic polity.109
(2) The tax is a means for resisting a form of domestic colo-
nial exploitation. Persons who live in fuel-poor regions have
no claim against persons who live in fuel-rich regions to re-
quire the latter to provide them cheap fuel without sharing in
the costs associated with extraction and depletion.
(3) A severance tax is like a property tax except that the ob-
10 Id. at 108-09.
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ject to which it attaches is continually being depleted. The
property subject to the severance tax will disappear and the
remaining land, stripped of its minerals, will be of diminished
value. The tax is a present hedge against a future loss.
(4) The tax is a cost that should be subject to market de-
mands. Consumers can exercise their political voices by mak-
ing market decisions.
(5) Conservation policies may be expressed locally through a
variety of mechanisms including taxes.
(6) If there is a national concern, it should be expressed
through national legislation by Congress so that the various
state interests effectively can voice their political concerns in
the national debate. The decision should not be made by a
court that effectively short-circuits the political process.110
110 On this point generally, see Fletcher, supra note 41; Rehnquist, The Notion of a
Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693 (1976). The debate is similar to that surrounding
the revival of substantive due process. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Com-
ment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications,
and Conclusive Presumptions: Three Linked Riddles, 39 LAW & CorTEMP. PROBs. 8 (1975);
Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975). Cf. Heymann &
Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765
(1973).
The debate about the proper scope of judicial review has been going on since Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Recent considerations of the question can be
found in, J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLITIcAL PROCEss (1980) and J.
ELY, DEMoCRACY AND DIsTRusT (1980). Dean Wellington recently wrote:
[C]oncern with judicial review is exaggerated if-as is generally the case-the con-
cern focuses on the countermajoritarian nature of the practice. Concern is appro-
priate, however, if prompted by the apparent finality of constitutional decisions
The key to mitigating concern with judicial review is found when one analyzes
the concept of finality and relates it to the judicial process. Many constitutional
decisions deal with means and not ends. Accordingly, they are often less final than
might be supposed. Moreover, because value determinations of either the policy or
the principle variety are problematic, judges are apt to make mistakes. But, at
least where principles are involved, mistakes can be discovered and mistaken deci-
sions amended by normal judicial processes.
Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 519 (1982) (footnote omit-
ted). I find myself in general agreement with the conclusions reached by Dean Wellington.
In the particular context of this article, however, the fundamental question of judicial re-
view or not is not posed. Rather, the central issue is the balance to be accorded various
constitutional principles during the process of review. The principle that seems to me to
have been shortchanged more often than not is the principle of federalism itself, as mani-
fested through constitutional structure. Giving appropriate weight to the values inherent in
that principle may involve judicial deference to the legislative process, but such deference
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The first five points in opposition to the tax may be made with
respect to almost any state or local tax or regulation that affects
interstate commerce. The essential issues are the burden involved,
the importance to the national economic health of the item or ser-
vice taxed, and the extent to which the tax is exported. Courts may
be equipped to deal with such issues to some extent. They may, for
instance, be able to determine whether or not a tax is discrimina-
tory or whether it attaches to something outside a state's jurisdic-
tion. As Commonwealth Edison indicates, however, courts may be
reluctant to engage in serious factual inquiries as to the relative
degree of exportation or burden. The majority in Commonwealth
Edison could have done more than apply the Complete Auto test
mechanically, but the refusal to become deeply involved in the
kind of analysis contemplated by Justice Blackmun's dissent was
not unreasonable.111 If there is a sufficient national interest, re-
sponsibility for action should lie with Congress. Courts should only
act to restrain state enactments that might effectively preclude the
opportunity for meaningful national action. 1 2
One of the most consistently expressed concerns has been that
those who may be most affected by state action that touches upon
interstate commerce do not have an opportunity for meaningful
participation in the political process.11 3 It is certainly true that
most of the consumers of electricity produced by Montana coal
cannot vote in Montana, but the concern may be overstated. Their
results not from concern about the appropriateness of judicial review but from a judicial
balancing of various constitutional concerns. There is a secondary, but important, question
of technical competence which does go to the appropriateness issue. Competency questions
can be raised in a number of judicial review contexts, but they seem especially compelling to
me when political bodies have openly debated matters of public concern and have reached
an explicit compromise-as in the case of Multistate Tax Compact-or an implicit under-
standing-as in congressional deference to state mechanisms for the imposition of fair tax
burdens on multijurisdictional enterprises.
21 See Historical Perspective, supra note 38, at 347-50.
112 See generally Note, supra note 43.
'" See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940); Rob-
bins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 495 (1887); L. TRI.mE, supra note 4, § 6-15,
at 347; Note, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HAxv. L. Rav. 93, 107-09 (1981). In the
words of Professor Eule, "[t]he contemporary dangers of state parochialism lie in its eviscer-




voices can be heard through the market and through Congress. If
the tax increases the price of coal, there are alternative fuel
sources. The market may not work to perfection and there may be
a host of reasons why an increase in tax might not bring about an
immediate market reaction, but at some point the tax is likely to
run into market resistance. Legislatures do not always act ration-
ally, but unless there was a strong interest in conserving the re-
source that justified a high, inhibitory tax, the legislature would, if
rational, reduce the tax to an acceptable market level. In addition,
utility companies, consumers (industrial, commercial, and domes-
tic), state utility regulation boards, and other interested groups all
have the opportunity and the incentive to lobby in Washington for
national legislation to deal with resource development and ex-
ploitation. 114 Nor is there anything to prevent local lobbying. The
power of affected companies as employers of local residents and as
contributors to political campaigns should not be minimized. Fi-
nally, hardly any state is self-sufficient. Those that are rich in coal
may be poor in water resources.11 There may be a quid pro quo
exacted, and certainly if interstate trade wars seem imminent, fed-
eral action would be appropriate. The right to vote, although im-
portant, is just one means by which political influence can be
exercised.
On balance, the arguments in favor of the local tax seem
stronger and more consistent with the structure of a federation of
sovereigns. There is, nevertheless, implicit in such arguments a
114 A state that is in a monopoly or strongly oligopolistic position may be impervious to
external market pressures so long as there is relative inelasticity of demand. If the product
at issue is one of national importance, the national political system should work to overcome
individual state trade barriers. The critical point for the judiciary comes when a state, im-
pervious to usual market barriers, imposes trade barriers on a product or service of national
importance and the political branches of the federal government fail or refuse to act. Is the
judicial branch then entitled to constitutionalize the problem, or does the inaction by Con-
gress and the President suggest that the problem is not one of sufficient moment to justify
national action? One must bear in mind that what is at issue in Commerce Clause cases of
this sort is the protection of one sovereign's interests as against those of another sovereign.
Unless the ground rules are changed and the debate shifted to questions of due process or
equal protection, the issue of an improper state intrusion into areas of individual liberty
simply is not present.
I'l On developing water concerns, see, for example, Quade, Water Wars Predicted in a
Thirsty Nation, 68 A.B.A. J. 1066 (1982).
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tone of parochialism which, if left unchecked, could lead to a form
of economic extortion practiced by the few people who live in fuel-
rich states against the many people who live in fuel-poor states-a
sort of domestic OPEC cartel.116 Access to energy resources is
largely the result of geological happenstance rather than the result
of a collective political decision. Since the doctrine of state "owner-
ship" of natural resources no longer applies, 117 there is a legitimate
concern about the abuse of happenstance to the economic detri-
ment of citizens of other states.11 To that extent there is reason to
argue that the dormant Commerce Clause may be activated by a
statute that seems to amount to a form of protectionism. The line
between protectionism and a legitimate exercise of state sover-
eignty can, however, be very thin. The value of federalism as a
mechanism for the assurance of a multiplicity of opportunities for
democratic participation should make courts defer to the wisdom
of state action absent clear and convincing proof of a burden on
interstate commerce that is discriminatory or that effectively sty-
mies national action. That is very much what the Court did in
Commonwealth Edison and, in a different context, in the Jicarilla
Apache case. The results in other cases involving dormant Com-
merce Clause issues have not been as consistent. 1 9
VI. THE 1982 INCOME TAX CASES
On June 29, 1982, the Supreme Court issued two decisions up-
holding taxpayer challenges to the imposition of certain state in-
come taxes. Asarco Inc. v. Idaho Tax Commission20 involved an
Idaho tax challenge by a large multistate mining company. F.W.
"I This precise problem has been a matter of considerable concern recently to our Ca-
nadian neighbors. Oil, coal, and natural gas are found in the sparsely populated western
provinces, but the industrial centers and major cities are in Ontario and Quebec. See Bal-
lem, The Energy Crunch and Constitutional Reform, 57 CAN. B. REv. 740 (1979). Professor
Eule has suggested an "outsider impact percentage" to determine the level of disproportion-
ate impact on out-of-state interests. Eule, supra note 11, at 460-74.
117 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), overruling Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S.
519 (1896). See generally Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce
Clause, and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 51.
I Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-
Owned Resources, 59 Tax. L. REv. 71, 92 (1980).
"' See supra note 11.
120 102 S. Ct. 3103 (1982).
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Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Department1 21 involved a
New Mexico tax challenge by F.W. Woolworth Co. Each taxpayer
had its headquarters in another state. The two states sought to tax
a proportionate share of total income, including income derived
from out-of-state operations, by the use of what is known as the
unitary business approach. Under the Uniform Division of Income
for Tax Purposes Act 122 and the provisions of the Multistate Tax
Compact,123 the unitary business income of a multistate corporate
taxpayer may be apportioned for income taxation among the vari-
ous states where the corporation does business. This avoids confis-
catory taxation while also making multistate enterprises bear some
of the costs of the various states in which they do business.
In both cases there were significant technical questions about
what constituted "business income" and how a unitary business is
to be defined within the meaning of the applicable statutes. The
most important aspect of these cases, for the purposes of this dis-
cussion, was the reliance of the Court on the Due Process Clause to
sustain the taxpayers' positions. In so doing, the Court in both
cases emphasized the necessity for an extensive judicial factual in-
quiry into the question of the "underlying unity or diversity of
business enterprise. 1 24
Although the facts peculiar to the two businesses were reasona-
bly complex, the general framework was fairly simple. Neither bus-
iness was headquartered in the taxing state, but each had a sub-
stantial local operation. Each received income from a variety of
different sources including divisions, subsidiaries, and related com-
panies operating in other states and in foreign countries. New
Mexico and Idaho each argued that income from many of these
different sources was income of a single enterprise and that the
nexus created by the local operation gave each state a right to de-
mand taxes on an allocable portion of the total income. The tax-
121 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982).
122 IDAHo CoDn § 63-3027 (Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-4-1 to 7-4-21 (Supp. 1981).
123 The Compact was sustained against Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment
challenges in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
124 Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at 3135 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,
445 U.S. 425, 440 (1980)).
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payers each argued that income from several of the sources could
not properly be characterized as that of a single business because
of various control factors and that the taxing state did not have
sufficient contact with the income from these extraterritorial
sources to assert a claim for taxes.
Whatever the merits of the technical arguments about whether
or not one business or the other could be properly characterized as
a single enterprise, the central legal issue of state authority to tax
could be analyzed under either the Commerce or the Due Process
Clause. The question really is the same as the one posed by Com-
monwealth Edison. Are the people of one state seeking to impose
taxes on the persons of other states over whom the former have no
jurisdiction? In due process terms the question is another version
of the taxation without representation argument. In Commerce
Clause terms the question is whether the tax inhibits the flow of
commerce by its extraterritorial effect. The majority chose to use a
due process analysis.
Justice Powell wrote the opinions in both Asarco and
Woolworth, in each case for a majority of six. 125 The Supreme
Court had recently decided that the major activities of two large
petroleum companies, Mobil and Exxon, were integrated into a
single business enterprise such that Vermont could tax an allocable
portion of Mobil's worldwide income from foreign subsidiaries and
affiliates, 126 and that Wisconsin could tax a portion of Exxon's in-
come from nonmarketing activities even though Exxon only en-
gaged in marketing within Wisconsin. 127 In the Mobil case Justice
Blackmun stated for the majority:
[We do] not mean to suggest that all dividend income re-
ceived by corporations operating in interstate commerce is
necessarily taxable in each State where that corporation does
business. Where the business activities of the dividend payor
have nothing to do with the activities of the recipient in the
taxing State, due process considerations might well preclude
125 The Chief Justice and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens completed
the majorities.
12 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
127 Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
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apportionability, because there would be no underlying uni-
tary business.'28
Both the Mobil and Exxon cases left open the possibility that a
taxpayer could seek to prove that its business operations were not
unitary and that portions of its operations should not be subject to
local taxation. The Court found that the taxpayer had met this
burden in both of the 1982 cases. Picking up on a statement in the
Mobil case that if the business activities in question had nothing to
do with the state, "due process considerations might well preclude
apportionability,' 129 Justice Powell ruled that the New Mexico and
Idaho assessments violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Both de-
cisions emphasized that the income in question was derived from
sources outside the taxing states and that the taxing states contrib-
uted nothing to its creation or protection.
Justice O'Connor wrote a sharp dissent in each case and was
joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist.130 The first paragraph
of her dissent in the Idaho case indicates the concern raised by the
majority's reliance on the Due Process Clause:
The Court today declares that the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution forbids a State from taxing a proportionate
share of the investment income of a nondomiciliary corpora-
tion doing business within its borders. In so doing, the Court
groundlessly strikes down the eminently reasonable assertion
of Idaho's taxing power at issue in this case. Far more dis-
maying, however, is that the Court's reliance on the Due Pro-
cess Clause may deprive Congress of the authority necessary
to rationalize the joint taxation of interstate commerce by the
50 States.'
Justice O'Connor raises two distinct issues, each of which is impor-
tant to a proper understanding of federalism questions before the
Court. First, she criticizes the Court's substitution of its factual
analysis for that of the state courts and taxing authorities. That
"1 445 U.S. at 441-42 (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 442.
ISO Asarco, 102 S. Ct. at 3117 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at 3140
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
131 Asarco, 102 S. Ct. at 3117 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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raises the perennial question of the Court's role in reviewing the
factual underpinnings of a state action when a constitutional chal-
lenge is raised. The readiness of the Court to engage in a complex
review of corporate accounting 3 2 suggests that this Court is far
from relinquishing the power of ultimate factual review in such
cases, however ill-equipped the members may be to undertake so-
phisticated policy reviews. Growing deference to states and to the
legislative process may, in other words, be more rhetorical than
real. Second, Justice O'Connor's concern with the use of the Due
Process Clause illustrates the Court's willingness to employ an in-
dividual rights approach to the solution of the problem that is, at
heart, more one of structure. This not only creates a dilemma for
Congress as Justice O'Connor noted, but it also suggests that the
Court has not yet come to terms with the function of the Constitu-
tion as a structural, organizational document as well as a shield
against state intrusion into areas of individual rights.
There can be little doubt that a tax, federal, state, or local,
might violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment. It does not follow, however, that a challenge to a
state tax with an extraterritorial impact must be analyzed in terms
of the Due Process Clause. The Interstate Commerce Clause al-
most invariably will be implicated, and that is certainly the case
when the challenger is a large, diversified, multistate corporation.
Indeed, the four-part Complete Auto test for Commerce Clause vi-
olations includes both a due process element and an equal protec-
tion element.133 Are there reasons for preferring the use of the
Commerce Clause in situations such as these?
The most straightforward reason to eschew a due process deci-
sion when a Commerce Clause one is possible is to retain maxi-
mum governmental flexibility. As the dissenters correctly pointed
out, the due process decision reached by the majority limits the
132 In some respects the Court's members may be better able to deal with accounting
problems than with questions of highway safety, but they seem equally willing to tackle
both. See supra note 11 and cases cited therein.
"' The nexus, discrimination, and fair apportionment prongs include both due process




ability of Congress to take effective remedial action if it is deter-
mined that national legislation is necessary to complement the
Multistate Tax Compact or otherwise to deal with the problems of
multistate taxation or the taxation of income from foreign subsidi-
aries or affiliates. The Chief Justice concurred "in reliance on the
Court's express statement that the Court's holdings do not pre-
clude further Congressional action in this area." 134 The majority
seemed to think that no such untoward result would follow because
"it is elementary that the 'states. .. are subject to limitations on
their taxing powers that do not apply to the federal govern-
ment.' "135 The majority's statement does not answer the basic
question. Certainly it is true that state and federal taxing powers
are not coextensive; both Commonwealth Edison and Complete
Auto recognize that. But the due process decisions reached in the
Idaho and New Mexico cases raise two distinctly different issues.
First, can Congress enact legislation that would define unitary bus-
iness income in such a way as to allocate the income in question in
these two cases to Idaho or New Mexico? The answer would seem
to be no, because the Due Process Clause, acting as a limit on gov-
ernmental control on individuals, requires as a matter of constitu-
tional law that there be a nexus as defined by the Supreme Court
before any tax liability could attach. Congress cannot by statute
create such a nexus when the Court has found that, for constitu-
tional purposes, there is no such nexus. Second, can the federal
government tax income from extraterritorial operations without vi-
olating the Due Process Clause? The government does so with the
imposition of income tax liability on worldwide income of Ameri-
can citizens and businesses.' 36 In addition, there are a number of
tax treaties with foreign governments that provide for the alloca-
tion of income by persons or businesses with income from more
than one country. Surely the Supreme Court did not mean to upset
this system, but if the Court sets standards of minimum contacts
necessary for a state to impose income taxes, then at least a ques-
tion is raised whether the same standard should apply to the fed-
eral government. Otherwise, the Court might be faced with the
134 102 S. Ct. at 3140 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
133 Id. at 3115 n.23 (quoting Woolworth).
SI.R.C. § 61 (1976).
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anomaly of having one due process standard for states and another
for the federal government.137 That is altogether different from
noting that the states and the federal government have different
powers of taxation. Whatever powers may exist are still subject to
individual due process limitations.
These problems could have been avoided by the use of the Com-
merce Clause. If the problem with the Idaho and New Mexico
taxes was that they attached to wholly extraterritorial activities,
that would seem to present a straightforward dormant Commerce
Clause case. In Commonwealth Edison the severance tax attached
to coal actually mined in Montana. Thus the basic nexus require-
ment was satisfied. The same was not true of the income tax cases,
at least on their faces. The review of the unitary business income
concept could just as well have been undertaken to determine
whether or not there was sufficient contact to satisfy the Complete
Auto test. A Commerce Clause result would not have affected Con-
gressional power to act in the future. Granted that there may be
due process questions raised by an attempt to engage in extraterri-
torial taxation, this particular issue (the unitary business appor-
tionment problem) had been roundly debated through the political
process and eventually solved by negotiation among the states.138
Congress apparently approved of this result. The Supreme Court,
137 In the preceding term the Court had suggested that such an anomaly would be im-
permissible. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981), where Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority said:
A state court may ... apply a more stringent standard of review as a matter of
state law under the State's equivalent to the Equal Protection or Due Process
Clauses.... But when a state court reviews state legislation challenged as viola-
tive of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not free to impose greater restrictions as
a matter of federal constitutional law than this Court has imposed. Oregon v.
Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
The standard of review under equal protection rationality analysis-without
regard to which branch of the state government has made the legislative judg-
ment-is governed by federal constitutional law, and a state court's application of
that standard is fully reviewable in this Court ....
449 U.S. at 461 n.6 (citations omitted).
238 See Reflections, supra note 38; Krol, Taxpayers Balking at Submitting to Audits of
Multistate Tax Commission, 43 J. TAX'N 364 (1975). The Court did nothing to preserve
federal sovereignty as against state intrusions. To the contrary, the due process focus of




instead of analyzing these two cases in a way that would preserve
maximum political flexibility, took an approach that placed the ju-
diciary in the midst of a political debate.
The Court's reliance on the Due Process Clause also reflects a
tendency, noted by Professor Nagel," 9 to rely upon an individual
rights paradigm rather than a structural approach to constitutional
adjudication. Here there was involved no high drama of the indi-
vidual struggling to assert himself against a powerful government.
Rather, there was a simple case (in form if not in fact) that only
required a decision about income characterization. The question
was largely one of the proper scope of a state's inherent taxing au-
thority. A structural approach would have satisfactorily defined
the limits of state sovereignty, would have left unquestioned the
power of national sovereignty, and would not have turned a techni-
cal economic decision into one of personal, individual rights that
brings into question the power of national authority as well. These
two cases would have been good opportunities for the Court to em-
ploy the dormant Commerce Clause analysis used in both Com-
plete Auto and Commonwealth Edison. That the Court chose in-
stead to follow the due process line suggests that there is either a
reluctance to meet structural arguments head-on or that the Court
rarely thinks in those terms. So many decisions of the post-World
War II era have involved individual rights questions that the
Court's use of the Commerce Clause as a principal focus of analysis
in some of the cases discussed in this article may have been more
aberrational than indicative of a trend. 140
Nagel, supra note 14.
1M The Court's retreat from its brief forays into a consideration of the values inherent
in federalism was also evident in a third decision announced a few days after the Idaho and
New Mexico tax cases. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982). In this case the Court
invalidated, on Commerce Clause grounds, a Nebraska regulation that permitted the inter-
state transportation of ground water only to states granting reciprocal rights to withdraw
and transport ground water back to Nebraska. This was done in the face of some 37 federal
statutes and numerous interstate compacts indicating a congressional deference to state
water law and in the face of Nebraska's consistent (intrastate as well as interstate) treat-
ment of ground water as a scarce natural resource to which a landowner has only a limited
right of use.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
The debates among the Framers showed a clear concern for the
preservation of the autonomy and integrity of the states. The loose
alliance created by the Articles of Confederation was evidence of
the distrust for a strong central government with its seat in some
distant place. Although some of the arguments in favor of a
noncohesive alliance may seem quaint to us,. they made a great
deal more sense in the late eighteenth century when about three
million people were scattered far across the country, connected
only by uncertain lines of communication. The victory of those
who sought a more cohesive union with a national government of
some consequence was, in retrospect, quite extraordinary. There
may well have developed over. time a greater sense of unity and
perhaps a national consensus, but there is little doubt that the
written Constitution was the catalyst for the creation of a single
nation. Provincial rivalries hardly disappeared. The Civil War was
a tragic and monumental testament to the vigor of sectionalism.
Even so, it was the existence of a strong idea of national unity,
evidenced by the Constitution itself, that provided the basis for
Lincoln to justify war to maintain the union.
The creation of a national government, its preservation in a
bloody war, and the great expansion of the national government in
the twentieth century did not eclipse the concern expressed at the
end of the eighteenth century for the maintenance of local auton-
omy. 14 1 The idea of federalism as incorporated into the Constitu-
tion is a magnificent example of effective compromise between
competing concerns. A supreme national government, but one of
strictly limited powers, was created. The structure of the govern-
mental organization itself contemplated the possibility of consider-
able state sovereignty and of large differences among the states. It
is indeed remarkable, for instance, that the union survived and
prospered as long as it did with a sectional disagreement on the
fundamental question of human slavery. That alone was a testa-
141 Although one noted commentator proclaimed the death of federalism, P. KURLAND,
POLrTIcs, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 96 (1970), his comments were a bit
premature. See, e.g., L. TRME, supra note 4, § 2-3, at 17.
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ment to the inherent flexibility of the system.142
Granted that the Constitution's organizational structure was the
result of a compromise devised to create a useful national govern-
ment, why is or should federalism-as a value-be important to us
today? Doesn't it create the risk of a revival of state legislation
aimed at limiting individual liberties? Isn't there a reasonable con-
cern that a multitude of state economic regulations, each individu-
ally acceptable, may in the sum create an economic Balkanization?
Has not the federal government been the most earnest protector of
individual rights and liberties? Although these questions certainly
are debatable, one can answer them all in the affirmative and still
argue that federalism is a core value in the American system and is
a significant contributor to the preservation of a stable, democratic
process.
There are two major functions of federalism, the importance of
each varying with time and circumstances. First, the federal sys-
tem provides a framework of competition. The structure of the na-
tional government itself is dependent in part on structural tensions
and competition. Federalism does the same on a grander scale. The
national Constitution keeps matters from getting out of hand, but
the virtues of healthy competition can be seen in the efforts of
states to outdo one another in advancing various political and eco-
nomic interests. By having fifty-one centers of self-interested insti-
tutions, there is created a liveliness that adds to the whole. If they
are all in good health, they can balance each other in ways that
prevent undue concentrations of power and maximize political par-
ticipation. Second, federalism provides a mechanism for experi-
mentation and for the recognition of social and cultural group dif-
ferences. There are few nations in the world that are as
heterogeneous in make-up as the United States. Federalism pro-
vides a built-in organizational structure for the recognition and
protection of that heterogeneity in a way that would be much more
142 Justice Rehnquist has argued that the nation might have postponed the inevitable
conflict over slavery somewhat longer, or perhaps even worked out a series of compromises
short of full scale war, had the Supreme Court not imposed a national standard in the Dred
Scott case that undercut legislative attempts at political compromise. Rehnquist, supra note
110, at 699-702.
[Vol. 32
FEDERALISM AND STATE TAXATION
difficult with a single, unified governmental structure. Professor
Emerson has argued that one of the functions of the First Amend-
ment is to be a "safety valve." Tensions that might be held in
check until explosive can be released through free speech.143 Feder-
alism provides a national "safety valve" structure by providing al-
ternative means for the operation of the democratic process.
A danger in deciding cases on constitutional grounds is that is-
sues that are susceptible of local treatment mby become national-
ized without any significant political debate. There are obvious is-
sues that should be handled at a national level. It seems clear to
me, for instance, that Plessy v. Ferguson144 was wrong and that
Brown v. Board of Education45 was right. Yet there are many
cases that raise constitutional questions, but that may be handled
better through the legislative process of a state in order to protect
the long-term institutional, structural stability of the system.
In Commonwealth Edison, Jicarilla Apache, and some of the
other cases discussed in this article, the Supreme Court seemed to
be groping toward an understanding of the dormant Commerce
Clause that would give substantial support to the values of federal-
ism by allowing maximum state action subject to control by the
political branches of the national government. One may quarrel
with the specifics of Court-created tests for Commerce Clause
analysis and with the Court's application of those tests. Neverthe-
less, embodied in those tests was a recognition, however muddled,
of the need to defend state sovereignty as well as individual rights
and national sovereignty. But then the Court simply ignored this
line of thinking in the 1982 Idaho and New Mexico tax apportion-
ment cases, and employed reasoning that not only nationalized the
issue but did it in such a way as to limit the power of even the
national political branches to operate. A state interpretation of a
relatively arcane (although important) corporate organization and
accounting concept was transformed into a matter of individual (or
at least corporate) right as against government, be it local, state, or
federal. This was done in two cases that seemed to cry out for dor-
143 T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970).
14 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
145 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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mant Commerce Clause treatment.14 The very question at hand
was the subject of a compact among the states, a compact that was
entered into to deal with a problem that Congress, although it had
had opportunities to act, had failed to address adequately.
Professors Tribe and Michelman in their criticisms of the Na-
tional League of Cities decision both interpreted the Court's opin-
ion within the framework of an individual rights paradigm.147 In
the words of Professor Tribe:
In broad outline, the argument is that policy-based legislation
by Congress that endangers the provision of certain vital ser-
vices, unlike similar legislation directed only at private par-
ties or at government services usually provided only privately,
is constitutionally problematic not because it strikes an unac-
ceptable balance between national and state interests as such,
but because it hinders and may even foreclose attempts by
states or localities to meet their citizens' legitimate expecta-
tions of basic governmental services. 148
This approach, although perhaps not without some merit, tends to
overlook the purposes of structure in the constitutional scheme. It
also reflects the tendency to place the individual rights paradigm
at the center of constitutional adjudication. That is precisely what
the Court did in the two 1982 tax apportionment cases. Federalism
116 Professor Eule has criticized the Court's failure to address adequately dormant
Commerce Clause issues and has argued that the Court should not be in the business of
trying to institutionalize through constitutional decision making an interstate free market
except when states engage in zealous protectionism. His arguments are certainly not without
merit. However, he goes on to suggest the substitution of a Privileges and Immunities
Clause analysis for the use of dormant Commerce Clause analysis. He recognizes that there
would be little utility to this approach unless the Court were to reverse its decision in Paul
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869), excluding corporations from the protection of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Eule, supra note 11, at 446-54. His argument is novel and
well-put, but it also suffers from the common failure to recognize the value of structure. The
use of the Privileges and Immunities Clause would substitute a line of analysis balancing
governmental action against individual or corporate interests for a line of analysis that fo-
cuses, in form if not in fact, on the relative statuses of sovereigns.
147 L. TRmE, supra note 4, § 5-7, at 240-41 n.2; §§ 5-21 to 5-22, at 307-318; Michelman,
States' Rights and States' Roles: The Permutations of Sovereignty in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unravelling National League of Cities: The
New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARv. L.
Rav. 1065 (1977).
148 L. Tama, supra note 4, § 5-22, at 313.
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as a central paradigm is not dead, but its resurrection or revitaliza-
tion is proceeding with all deliberate speed.

